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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring 
and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve 
higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers’ trust. The 
optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and 
public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality 
premium, (3) customers’ information regarding firms’ quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup 
information about firms’ quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social 
norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food 
scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases 
and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into 
account direct implementation costs. 
Keywords: collective reputation, free riding, public monitoring, peer monitoring, peer sanction  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In agricultural and other industries, firms sometimes sell their products under a collective brand such as a 
geographical indication (GI) or a group logo (Verbeke and Roosen 2009).
1 The literature that studies the 
economics of collective brands views them as being solutions to an information problem in the provision 
of quality that the consumer cannot detect before purchasing the good (Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 
2008). There are several explanations for why a collective brand is more attractive than an individual 
brand. According to one approach, firms use collective brands to share the costs of credible auditing and 
certification by a central organization (Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008, and references therein).
2 
According to another approach, a collective brand is the bearer of the collective reputation of a regional 
product or a group of producers that are not individually known to the consumer (Winfree and McCluskey 
2005; Fishman et al. 2010).
3 In this paper, we follow the latter approach but consider a novel role for 
intragroup information.  
Previous studies of GIs as a reputation-pooling device have suggested different mechanisms that 
allow a group of firms with a common reputation to overcome the free-riding problem. Fishman et al. 
(2010) considered a “once and for all” investment in quality and heterogeneous investment costs. They 
showed that the exogenous group composition, whereby all firms that participate in a collective brand 
have the same investment cost, provides an incentive to invest in quality that countervails the incentive to 
free ride. Winfree and McCluskey (2005) considered an ad hoc model of collective reputation as a 
common resource (a stock of consumer goodwill) with homogeneous producers and suggested that trigger 
strategies that prescribe collective shirking as a punishment for individual shirking can overcome free 
riding and sustain quality.
4 Whether this kind of quality cartel is implementable in a belief-based model 
of collective reputation is an issue that we take up in this paper.  
Our main contribution is to characterize the number of firms in a group that maximizes the value 
of group reputation in an environment that has moral hazard and imperfect public and local peer 
monitoring of quality choices. From a positive perspective, we show how local social norms that 
prescribe peer monitoring and the end of intragroup trust as a punishment for shirking can influence the 
reputation of regional products and agricultural cooperatives. We also suggest an explanation for food 
scares as part of a mechanism that sustains customers’ trust and industrywide norms. From a normative 
perspective, we show that collective brands improve welfare because they efficiently aggregate consumer 
and producer information about a group’s performance; they may also save the need for costly external 
auditing and certification of compliance. Our model suggests that the analysis of policies that make it 
either easier or more difficult to maintain a fixed group membership and a commitment to sell under a 
collective brand, such as protection of the right to use a GI and mandatory traceability, should take into 
account the effects of those policies on endogenous punishment mechanisms and intragroup behavior 
(ERS 2011; Golan et al. 2004).  
We build on the Cai and Obara (2009) model (CO model) of firm reputation and the Kandori 
(1992) model of social norms. Our model is a repeated games model with a group of anonymous firms 
                                                      
1 Examples of products marked with geographic origin are Washington apples, Florida oranges, and Kona coffee (Babcock 
et al. 2008). In the European Union, GIs typically convey a certain quality and product specification (Giovannucci et al. 2009). 
However, a GI protected as a certification mark in the United States only certifies the geographic origin of products, and firms 
are entitled to use a GI to label their products by the virtue of their location within the geographic area indicated by the GI 
(USPTO 2011). In our setting, a GI label is a means of informing consumers that the product originates in the area indicated by 
the label.  
2 Geographical indications based on appellations and membership in industry organizations and food safety programs 
frequently involve meeting a minimum quality standard and auditing to ensure compliance (Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 
2008). 
3 A large literature studies firm reputation under asymmetric information (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis 2008). 
4 Winfree and McCluskey (2005) found that an increase in the number of firms in a group reduces the incentive to provide 
quality. Their results suggest that, all else equal, producers should prefer to implement firm-level traceability and to sell their 
products under individual brands. Therefore, in the absence of exogenous fixed labeling or traceability costs, their model cannot 
explain why producers voluntarily “pool” their individual reputations under the umbrella of a collective brand.  
2 
that sell experience goods, meaning that customers do not directly know the individual firms and cannot 
observe product quality at the time of purchase. In each period, firms simultaneously choose whether to 
exert costly efforts that determine their products’ quality in that period. Although no firm-level 
traceability and direct penalties for shirking, such as liability for unsafe products, exist in the model 
(though there is group-level traceability), customers’ past consumption experience (for example, reports 
of unsafe products by media) and groupwide norms can provide an endogenous incentive to exert costly 
efforts. In order to develop a simple reputational theory of group size, we ignore auditing and certification 
of quality and other channels, such as provision of credit, inputs, training, and price information, as well 
as group-level economies of scale in production and marketing, through which producer organizations can 
increase members’ profits.
5 Here we focus on endogenous incentives and choices at the firm level.
6 
A novel feature of our model is that customers’ trust is maintained by a combination of imperfect 
public and local peer monitoring and punishments.
7 We characterize equilibrium in simple trigger 
strategies, whereby the group loses its reputation and quality premium forever once the public signal falls 
below a certain cut-off point.
8 In addition, in equilibrium, firms can threaten each other with a self-
enforcing peer sanction for shirking—that is, if a firm detects shirking by another firm, the latter firm will 
subsequently shirk itself forever afterward. On the other hand, firms reciprocate and exert high efforts as 
long as their neighbors do not shirk and customers deem the group trustworthy. In our setting, the 
credibility of the “quality cartel” is based on incomplete firm-level traceability, fixed group membership, 
and private information that firms have about each other.
9 
We chose a specific intragroup information structure (horizontal information network) with two 
considerations in mind. First, this structure relaxes the assumption of perfect private information while 
keeping the model tractable. Second, it reflects the local nature of private information in large groups, 
which seems plausible in the context of agricultural markets with geographically dispersed production. 
We assume that firms are located around a circle and that they perfectly observe the past efforts of 
adjacent neighbor(s) but have no private information about more distant neighbors. So, private 
information is locally perfect in the sense that firms never wrongly believe that a neighbor shirks.
10 On 
the other hand, public information of the overall group’s performance is imperfect in that sometimes 
customers observe a bad public signal even in the absence of shirking. Thus, in equilibrium, an eventual 
breakdown in cooperation among members is triggered by the loss of customers’ trust rather than by the 
actual shirking of members. The model retains a convenient recursive structure because member payoffs 
and the cost of maintaining reputation depend only on the cut-off point of the public signal that is 
implementable in equilibrium.  
In our model, collective branding has three effects on reputation: a positive peer monitoring 
effect, a positive information effect, and a negative free-riding effect. First, the effect of peer monitoring 
is positive because it deters shirking: A shirker who is monitored by peers will trigger a breakdown in 
                                                      
5 Our model can be easily extended to include exogenous means of eliciting efforts, such as third-party certification of 
quality and liability for safety failures. The qualitative nature of our results will not change if a central organization monitors 
performance and punishes shirking, as long as the severity of punishments is limited (for example, by a firm’s financial assets). 
6 Although auditing and enforcement of quality standards are common means of incentivizing quality provision, they are not 
always effective. For example, public inspections, such as pesticide residue monitoring, were considered unreliable in several 
developing countries (World Bank 2005). In addition, safety violations can occur despite routine inspections due to poor 
communication among government agencies (Mundy and Tomson 2010).  
7 It is well known in the group lending literature (Ghatak 1999; Che 2002) that internal monitoring of local production 
practices can overcome the free-riding problem. We do not consider exogenous peer pressure and sanctions in team production as 
in Barron and Gjerde (1997). 
8 That is, the group forever loses customers’ loyalty and trust that the members exert high effort. As demonstrated in the Cai 
and Obara (2009) model, the public punishment by the permanent Nash reversion (that is, repetition of the Nash equilibrium 
forever) can be replaced by a temporary public punishment, whereby the firms reduce their prices until the public signal rises 
above a certain threshold.  
9 We consider traceability as a means of differentiating groups according to their history of quality rather than establishing 
liability for safety failures (Pouliot and Sumner 2009). 
10 Although we show that the group of producers can sustain discipline when each member is observed by a few (or just one) 
other members in the group, informational “connectedness” among members is critical for our results.  
3 
cooperation among group members, which will eventually lead to collective shirking and make the loss of 
customers’ trust more likely. Second, we assume that member-specific idiosyncratic shocks are 
independent and are thus averaged out by the law of large numbers in the public signal of the overall 
group’s performance. Therefore, the information effect is positive, because aggregating information 
across members makes public monitoring less noisy. With more precise public signals, reputation of high 
quality is easier to maintain if members exert high efforts, but it is easier to lose if members shirk. 
Finally, collective branding creates free-riding opportunities because a deviation by each member has less 
impact on the public signal in the short run (this is not true in the long run, because individual deviation 
will be detected by peers and will trigger collective shirking).  
We find that even with very local peer monitoring, firms achieve higher profits under collective 
branding as long as they care sufficiently about the future—in that trades are sufficiently frequent or 
public information disseminates sufficiently rapidly—and the group size is not too small or too large. 
Group reputation may be easier to maintain than individual reputation because a group of firms can 
complement fast-working but uncertain public punishment for shirking with slow-working but certain 
peer punishment. The public punishment can thus be softened relative to that for an individual firm. The 
peer punishment works slowly in that news of the breakdown in cooperation spreads from neighbor to 
neighbor rather than through a common public signal. Thus, if the future is not sufficiently important or 
the number of firms is too small or too large, peer monitoring may not compensate for free-riding 
opportunities. In other words, too few firms may lack the critical mass needed to make peer punishment 
sufficiently severe, whereas too many firms may excessively slow the intragroup learning. 
The optimal size of the group is determined by the following trade-off: On the one hand, adding 
another member makes it easier for customers to detect collective shirking because there is less 
idiosyncratic noise. On the other hand, individual shirking is more difficult to detect, and given the 
intragroup information structure, the average distance among firms increases, which slows the unfolding 
of peer sanction and may undermine its credibility. We show that under some conditions, the optimal size 
of the group is larger when trades are more frequent or when public information disseminates more 
rapidly, or when the deviation gain is smaller relative to reputation premium, or when customer 
information about firms’ choices is more precise. We also find that the group maintains trust more easily 
when there are more information linkages among group members (that is, more global peer monitoring). 
Although empirical evidence shows that price premiums for regional products depend on 
collective reputation (Landon and Smith 1998; Quagrainie, McCluskey, and Loureiro 2003; Castriota and 
Delmastro 2008), to our knowledge, no empirical studies explicitly test how such “quality cartels” are 
sustained. Nonetheless, some previous empirical findings are consistent with our model. For example, in 
an empirical study of pesticide residues on vegetables supplied by farmer organizations, Naziri et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that larger groups are more likely to sustain cooperation and rely on internal (but not 
necessarily peer) monitoring.
11 In addition, in a case study of compliance with international food safety 
standards by a group of smallholder farmers, Okello and Swinton (2007) found that members police each 
other in order to reduce the cost of external inspection of geographically dispersed farms.  
A study of farmer organizations in Vietnam (Moustier et al. 2010) illustrates the key features of 
our model. According to the authors’ findings, participation in farmer groups is voluntary and with the 
intention of undertaking joint social or economic activities related to production and marketing. In 
addition, some of the farmer groups in the sample sell most of their output directly to consumers at 
premium prices, label their products with group-specific logos, and are concerned with group reputation 
for quality. The authors concluded that farmer groups reduce transaction costs and moral hazard problems 
related to product quality through members’ first-hand knowledge of local production practices and 
internal inspections of quality. Furthermore, four out of eight farmer organizations in the sample are 
“characterized by neighbor and/or kinship relationships between the members which allow trust to 
                                                      
11 In an experimental study, Huck and Lunser (2010) found that sellers can build successful group reputations as long as 
groups are small but do not allow for internal group monitoring (thus, their setting corresponds to the case of no peer monitoring 
in our model).  
4 
develop and facilitate the control of farmer behavior” (Moustier et al. 2010, 77). 
Related Literature  
Our model is closely related to the literature on collective reputation (Tirole 1996; Evans and Guinnane 
2007; Levin 2009), umbrella branding (Andersson 2002; Cabral 2009; Choi 1998; Cai and Obara 2009), 
and incentives and social norms in groups (Kandori 1992; Spagnolo 1999; Che and Yoo 2001; Che 2002). 
Tirole (1996) investigated persistence of collective reputation in a model in which individual histories are 
imperfectly observed by the trading partners or group members and shirkers are punished by temporary or 
permanent exclusion. Evans and Guinnane (2007) studied the formation of common reputation among 
identifiable groups with a regulator who maintains the groups’ quality standards. In our model, firms are 
endogenously incentivized by both customers and peers, rather than by explicit devices such as public 
certification or the threat of exclusion from the group.  
Individual reputations can also be linked across products or markets via umbrella branding and 
horizontal integration, as in the CO model with moral hazard and imperfect public monitoring. The CO 
model considers a single decisionmaker before and after horizontal integration, and thus implicitly 
assumes that the size of a firm or a brand does not affect the decision making process within the firm. 
Whereas CO considered the reputation of a single horizontally integrated firm, we keep the size of firms 
unchanged and consider the reputation of a group of firms that have some private information about each 
other.
12 In the CO model, the diminishing returns to horizontal integration are due to the common 
component in the firm-specific noise, which limits the positive effect of information aggregation across 
different markets that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In this paper, the optimal size of the collective 
brand (or the collection of independent branches of a large firm) is finite due to partial peer monitoring 
among members (or branch managers) rather than to persistent noise in public monitoring (for further 
discussion see Section 7). 
The idea that cooperation within a group can be sustained by a social norm, whereby a single act 
of shirking means the breakdown of trust within the entire group, was first developed in a repeated games 
model with random matching and local perfect observability in Kandori (1992). In a recent paper, 
Wolitsky (2011) shows that in a setting with continuous payoffs and network monitoring with either 
random or fixed matching of players who observe each others’ choices, the maximum level of 
cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. In our model, there is local perfect observability of 
efforts by producers that are connected by a fixed network, but consumers imperfectly observe the group’s 
performance. None of the previous studies of repeated games with community enforcement (Ellison 
1994) and public good provision (Bendor and Mookherjee 1990, Pecorino 1999, Haag and Lagunoff 
2007) consider a combination of imperfect public and private monitoring as a means of supporting 
cooperation, as we do in this paper. 
Also, the literature on group lending and incentives in teams (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999) has 
explored the mechanisms through which peer sanctions can alleviate moral hazard problems in the 
context of joint liability contracts. Our paper is particularly closely related to Che and Yoo (2001) and 
Che (2002), who endogenized peer punishment behavior in a repeated game similar to ours.
13 However, 
their models consider contractual arrangements such that only current payoffs are contingent on the public 
signal, whereas the public signal affects future payoffs in our model. As a result, Che and Yoo did not 
consider interactions between maintaining reputation and peer sanction; they also did not allow for local 
peer monitoring.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, 
we characterize the equilibrium with group reputation and self-enforcing peer sanction. In Section 4, we 
                                                      
12 Also related is a paper by Rob and Fishman (2005) in which a larger firm serves more consumers, which facilitates 
intergenerational consumer learning about the firms’ performance and thus improves public monitoring. 
13 Che and Yoo (2001) considered labor contracting with binary efforts and two-member teams, and Che (2002) considered 
group lending in a model with continuous effort and a more general signal structure. Our paper is also related to Spagnolo (1999), 
who investigated the linking of social interaction and production interaction in a repeated setting with perfect information.  
5 
obtain the main results about optimal group size and examine how it is affected by the model’s 
parameters. In Section 5, we examine the role of an intragroup information structure. In Section 6, we 
comment on the robustness of our results to the possibility of renegotiation. In Section 7, we discuss 
applications of our findings to GIs, mandatory traceability, and the theory of the firm, and consider policy 
implications. We conclude in Section 8.  
6 
2.  MODEL 
We adopt Cai and Obara’s (2009) notation. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite, t = 1, 2,… . There 
is a group of n  identical long-lived, risk-neutral firms (members of the group) that sell their products to a 
large number of identical risk-neutral customers. If  1 = n , then we say that the firm sells under an 
individual brand; otherwise, the brand is collective.
14 We assume that the firms sell their products into a 
competitive downstream market with zero markup in which their products are randomly matched with 
buyers. Thus, under collective branding there is mutual anonymity whereby a buyer does not observe the 
identity of the seller and vice versa.
15 Let  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ  denote the common discount factor.  
At the beginning of each period, each firm i sets its price  t i p ,  for the period, and its customers 
decide whether to purchase one unit of the firm’s products. If customers do not buy, both the customers 
and the firm get a payoff of zero. If customers decide to buy, the payoffs depend on the product quality 
which can be high or low. Each firm simultaneously decides whether to exert high effort  h e  or low effort 
l e  at a cost  h c  or  l c , respectively, where  h l e e <  and  h l c c < . Each firm produces one unit and firm’s 
choice of effort is fixed for the period (the effort is firm-specific), and  l h e e − = ∆  denotes the effort 
differential. We assume that the group’s members cannot side contract or exchange payments among 
themselves.
16 The customers’ expected per-period benefit is  h v  if they buy a product produced by the 
member who chooses  h e  and is  l v  if the member chooses  l e , where  h l v v < . After price  l v p >  is 
posted, the stage game in the normal form is depicted below. 
 
Firm              
  Low  High 
 Don’t Buy  0, 0  0, 0 
 Buy  p vl − l c p− ,   p vh − h c p − ,  
 
 
We assume that  h h l l c v c v − < < − 0 ; in other words, trade is socially efficient when a member 
exerts high effort, but it becomes socially inefficient if effort is low. The unique Nash equilibrium of the 
stage game (Don’t Buy, Low) is Pareto-dominated by the outcome (Buy, High) for any  ) , ( h h v c p∈ . In 
the absence of credible auditing and certification of quality, the efficient outcome can still be attained 
when firms are concerned with customers’ future trust.  
As in the CO model, we assume that the purchasing decision of a single buyer has no impact on 
sellers’ profits; thus, each customer will buy if and only if buying generates a nonnegative payoff in the 
current period. In order to focus on reputation effects, we assume that the market is long on the buyers’ 
side, so that, provided trading takes place, each firm sets the price that equals consumers’ willingness to 












− = = τ  denote the ratio of the cost savings from shirking to the firm’s current period 
payoff when efficient trade takes place at price  h v p = . For  δ
δ τ − < 1 , the first-best outcome is achieved in 
the standard reputational model with perfect public information, if in each period firms set  h v p =  and 
                                                      
14 For simplicity, we ignore any fixed costs or direct economies of scale associated with forming a group or collective brand.  
15 For example, supermarkets sell fruits and vegetables produced by a large number of growers, and farmer marketing 
cooperatives sell livestock and crops on behalf of their members.  
16 Although this assumption may not adequately capture the organization and functions of some producer groups, it seems 
reasonable in the context of collective brands, such as geographical indications, as participants typically do not exchange 
payments contingent on the results of peer monitoring. 
Customers  
7 
choose high effort and if all customers buy as long as none of the firms exerted low effort in the past.
17 
Note that under perfect public information, peer monitoring by group members cannot increase payoffs, 
because customers can punish shirking without mistakes.  
Public Information  
As discussed in the CO model, public information of a firm’s effort can be noisy for many reasons, such 
as unobservable inputs in production, interference with other products in consumption, and noisy 
communication of experience among customers.
18 With this in mind, we assume that customers observe  
t i t i e , , ε +  
for each firm  n i ,..., 1 = , but without knowing its identity, where  t i e ,  is the effort chosen by firm i in 
period t, and
  t i, ε  are mean-zero normally distributed noise terms with variance 
2 σ  that are independent 
across firms and time periods. Although firm-level information of the effort choice is available, given 
random matching and anonymity between buyers and sellers, the average signal 








t i t i t e
n
y ε           (1) 
is a sufficient statistic for the effort choice of any group member. Therefore, the public information of the 
effort choices made by the members of the group in period t  is given by the noisy signal (1). 
Note that customers ignore signals of the individual performance of group members as long as 
customers can commit not to exclude from the group firms that produced low quality in the past. 
Otherwise, individual quality histories will matter, because customers will anticipate future changes in 
group membership as a result of imperfect public monitoring. The commitment to nonexclusion of 
underperformers (either by customers or by the members of the group) is credible when a product cannot 
be traced to its firm of origin within the group and when firms’ private information is unverifiable.  
Note that with the following (inconsequential) parametric restrictions, we can interpret  t i t i e , , ε +  
as the utility of consumption and  h h h e e E v = + = ] [ ε  and  l l l e e E v = + = ] [ ε  as the willingness of risk-
neutral consumers to pay for high- and low-quality products. In particular,  t i t i e , , ε +  can represent a 
quality attribute, such as food safety, wherein  h e  denotes the adoption of food safety practices (ex ante 
safe food),  l e  denotes the nonadoption of food safety practices (ex ante unsafe food), and noise terms 
t i, ε  are the contamination risks (food safety incidents). Thus, ex ante safe food can become contaminated 
due to a negative shock. Similarly, ex ante unsafe food can actually pose no hazard to human health due 
to a positive shock. 
For simplicity, we ignore group-specific noise that, for example, may arise due to shocks to 
product quality at the retail level or the use of common inputs by the members of the group. Adding 
group-specific noise to the public signal will slightly complicate the notation but will not change the 
qualitative nature of the results. In contrast to the CO model of reputation of a single large firm serving 
many markets, our theory of the optimal group size is not predicated upon the existence of common 
production noise. A common component in the noise terms limits the impact of the aggregation of 
                                                      
17 Note that 
δ
δ τ − < 1  is equivalent to 
l
c p c p
h − > −
−
δ 1 —that is, the present value of the firm’s payoffs over the infinite horizon 
is greater than the one-time deviation gain.  
18 For example, in the case of a recent E. coli outbreak, it was finally determined that German bean sprouts caused the 
outbreak rather than Spanish cucumbers, which were initially considered to be the cause of the outbreak (Stevens 2011).  
8 
individual signals on the informativeness of the public signal in (1), thus reducing the advantages 




Each firm has some private information about the efforts chosen by the other firms. We consider a special 
class of intragroup information structures whereby each firm i  observes the past effort choices of all 
firms in its z-firm neighborhood, that is, of all firms  ,..., | {| n z i j − ∈ } | | n z i+ , where  x n x n − = | |  if 
0 ≤ x ,  n x x n − = | |  if  1 + ≥ n x , and  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ n z . An interpretation is that firms are located around a 
circle, and each firm perfectly observes the efforts chosen by its z  neighbor(s) to the left and z  
neighbor(s) to the right, but it does not observe the effort choices of its more distant neighbors.  







s s y  and prices 
1




s s , where 
n
i t i t p 1 , } { p = = . Firm i ’s private history of the game is the 
sequence of the efforts 
1






s i  chosen by all firms in its z-firm neighborhood, where 
} ,..., ,..., { e , | | , , | | , s z i s i s z i
z
s i n n e e e + − = . We assume that customers base their period t  decisions on  ) p , H ( t t . 
The pricing decision of each firm in periods  ,... 3 , 2 = t  depends on ( t H ,
1






s i ), and its effort decision 
depends on ( t H ,
1






s i , t i p , ).  
Trigger Strategies 
Even though this game admits many equilibria, including a repetition of the Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game in which all customers and firms choose (Don’t Buy, Low), we focus on a cut-off grim trigger 
strategy equilibrium, in which both customers and firms adopt the following strategies: Each firm and its 
customers choose (Buy, High) in the first period at price  h v .
20 All customers continue to choose Buy as 
long as  t y  stays above some threshold  y ~ and the price does not exceed  h v ; they choose Don’t Buy 
forever at any price greater than  l v  once  t y  falls below the threshold  y ~. In other words, customers who 
are offered a product at  t i p ,  in period t  play 
; or    , 1 ,..., 1 for     ~   and     if   , , , l t i s h t i v p t s y y v p Buy ≤ − = ≥ ≤        (2) 
Don’t Buy, if otherwise 
Each firm continues to choose High as long as  y  stays above the threshold  y ~ and all of its 
neighbors chose High in all of the previous periods; each firm chooses Low forever once either  y  falls 
below the threshold  y ~ or the firm itself or at least one of its neighbors chose Low in the past. That is, each 




 − = = ≥
=
otherwise   if   ,





s i s h
t i
e
t s e e y y e
e .      (3) 
                                                      
19 The existence of a common trait is explored in a repeated games model in Evans and Guinnane (2007). 
20 For example, traditions and social ties among group members or a central organization may help “select” this equilibrium.   
9 
Note that the strategy in (3) calls for the most severe endogenous peer sanction for shirking.  
We first characterize perfect equilibria with grim trigger strategies in (2) and (3) that maximize 
the per-firm payoff given a fixed number of firms n. Then we characterize the number of firms 
* n  that 
maximizes the greatest average equilibrium payoff for each firm in the group. For some values of 
parameters (for example, sufficiently low δ ), the unique equilibrium for any number of firms is the 
repetition of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (Don’t Buy, Low), in which case 
* n  is trivially 
indeterminate. Then we set 
* n =0 as the number of firms that has no effect on the equilibrium outcome. 
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3.  COLLECTIVE REPUTATION WITH PUBLIC AND PEER PUNISHMENTS 
We refer to a stationary cut-off grim trigger strategy equilibrium with peer monitoring as a reputation by 
cooperation equilibrium. The periods in which the group’s reputation is good and consumers are willing 
to pay up to  h v  are called the reputation-by-cooperation phase; the periods in which the group’s 
reputation is good but some (or possibly all) firms exert low efforts (on an out-of-equilibrium path) is 
called the peer punishment phase; finally, the periods during which the group’s reputation is bad are 
called the public punishment phase. 
As in the CO model and Cabral (2009), the pricing decision is straightforward.
21 When the 
group’s reputation is good, each firm is to provide high effort in the current period and sets the price 
h v p =  (the customer’s expected valuation). If the group loses its reputation and each firm is to provide 
low effort forever, then its price has to be at least  l c  to cover the cost. Because customers expect that 
firms will choose low effort, they will only buy if the price does not exceed  l v , which, by assumption, is 
not sufficient to cover  l c . Therefore, whenever customers expect the firms to choose low effort, the 
equilibrium outcome is (Don’t Buy, Low) for all firms, and price is indeterminate. If a firm provides low 
effort while the group’s reputation is good, it will continue to set the price equal to  h v , because a price 
below  h v  decreases the firm’s profit in the current period and does not, by itself, alter the behavior of 
customers and the other firms in the future. The firm never sets the price above  h v  because then there will 
be no trade in the current period, which cannot be optimal when the group’s reputation is good. 
It is convenient to let 
n
e y h k
/ σ
− =  denote the normalized public signal (henceforth, we will refer to 
k  rather than  y  as the public signal).
22 Then, by (1), (2), and (3), the probability of reputation by 
cooperation continuing conditional on all firms exerting effort  h e  is  ) ( 1 k Φ −  because, by assumption, 













∑ − = = , where Φ  is the standard normal distribution function. In addition, let k
~
 denote 
the cut-off signal used in the equilibrium. Then the per-firm average payoff when reputation is good and 
all members exerted high efforts in the past satisfies the following familiar recursive equation: 
0 , 0 , ))
~
( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( n h n k c p π δ δ π Φ − + − − = ,         (4) 
where the subscript “n, 0” stands for the number of members in the group (n) and the number of current 
shirkers (0). To simplify notation, we adopt the convention of the repeated games literature and measure a 
firm’s payoff as its expected profit averaged over the infinite horizon (that is, the sum of discounted 
profits multiplied by  δ − 1 ), instead of as its total discounted expected profits. This convention permits 
an easy comparison between repeated and stage-game payoffs, as they are both measured in the same 
“payoff per period” units. Equation (4) says that the member’s per-period value in the equilibrium is the 
                                                      
21 We ignore the possibility that firms may use prices or some other form of communication to signal their identity and 
establish their firm-specific reputation with buyers. Equilibria in which firms signal their identity to customers via prices can be 
easily ruled out, because each firm can mimic prices chosen by other firms as long as prices are included in the public history of 
the game. It is worth pointing out that even though in equilibrium firms collude on the monopoly price, our concern is not 
whether collective branding helps firms exercise market power but whether it endogenously provides incentive to exert high 
effort. The model can be easily extended to allow for a price (or quantity) competition among firms, though this is at the cost of 
obscuring how the group’s structure interacts with its reputation.  
22 Note that  n /
2 σ  is the variance of the public signal in (1).  
11 
sum of its current period profit averaged out over time,  ) )( 1 ( h c p − −δ , plus the expected average value 
from continuation,  0 , ))
~
( 1 ( n k π δ Φ − . 
During the out-of-equilibrium peer punishment phase, when  1 ≥ m  adjacent firms exert low 
efforts in the current period, the average payoff for a shirker satisfies the following equation:
23 
] , 2 min[ , , ))
~
( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( n z m n n l m n m k c p +
∆ + Φ − + − − = π δ δ π
σ .      (5) 
Equation (5) says that during the peer punishment phase, the per-period value of the firm that shirks is the 
sum of its current period profit averaged out over time,  ) )( 1 ( l c p − −δ , plus the expected average value 
from continuation,  ] , 2 min[ , ))
~
( 1 ( n z m n n m k +
∆ + Φ − π δ
σ . In accordance with (3), if m  adjacent firms shirk 
in the current period, then  ] , 2 min[ n z m+  firms will shirk in the following period while the peer 
punishment phase lasts. As the peer punishment phase unfolds, there will be at most 2z additional firms (z 
firms to the left and z firms to the right of the subgroup of shirkers) that no longer believe that the 
reputation-by-cooperation phase would continue.  
So, during the reputation phase, each firm achieves a higher payoff by choosing  h e  if the 
following incentive compatibility (no-shirking) constraint is satisfied 
1 , 0 , n n π π ≥ .            (6) 
In addition, we need to verify that the threat of peer punishment is credible (sequentially optimal). 
Specifically, a member that detects shirking by its neighbor for the first time achieves a higher payoff by 
subsequently choosing  l e  itself if 




( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( n z m n n
m
h m n k c p − +
∆ − + Φ − + − − ≥ π δ δ π
σ  for  n z n m ],..., 2 1 , min[ + = ,  (7) 
where m  is the feasible number of adjacent shirkers. The right side of (7) is the sum of time-averaged 
current payoffs from exerting a high effort plus the continuation value when there are  1 − m  shirkers in 
the current period and  ] , 1 min[ n z z m − + +  shirkers in the next period. 
A repeat shirker (a member who knows that the peer punishment phase has started) will achieve 
higher profits by continuing to shirk if 




( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( n z m n n
m
h m n k c p +
∆ − + Φ − + − − ≥ π δ δ π
σ  for  n z n m ],..., 2 1 , min[ + = . (8) 
The difference between (7) and (8) is that a repeat shirker cannot slow the unfolding of the peer 
punishment phase because, in accordance with the effort strategy in (3), all immediate 2z neighbors of the 
repeat shirker continue to shirk, regardless of that shirker’s choice of effort. 
As in the CO model, by (4), the average payoff in the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium is 
given by 
                                                      
23 Note that, respectively, customers and each firm have imperfect information about the changes in effort choices of the 
entire group and all firms outside that firm’s z-neighborhood. Nonetheless, the posterior beliefs of customers and firms that are 
yet to detect shirking by their neighbors are not affected by ongoing shirking, because, initially, the prior beliefs of both 




( 1 ( 1













π .          (9) 
Because (9) is decreasing in k
~
, in an equilibrium that yields the greatest per firm average payoff the cut-
off point of the public signal is given by the smallest k
~
, denoted by  n k , such that the incentive 
compatibility constraints (6)–(8) are satisfied. Instead of characterizing the range of parameters for which 
a reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium exists, we identify more restrictive conditions under which (6)–
(8) are satisfied and under which firms achieve higher payoffs from collective branding than from 
individual branding.  
The case of individual reputation with  1 = n  is analyzed in the CO model, and it serves as a 
benchmark to determine the participation criterion here. Under individual reputation, there is trivially no 




 = − = ≥
=
−
otherwise   if   ,
; 1 or    , 1 ,..., 1 for    
~







t t s k e
e
h s
σ .      (10) 
Cai and Obara (2009) show that under individual branding in the perfect public equilibrium that  
yields the greatest average payoff for the firm (and welfare) in the class of all perfect public equilibria, 
consumers buy in accordance with (2) and the firm sets  ) ( , h t i v p p = =  and chooses effort in accordance 
with (10) provided that discount factor δ  is sufficiently close to 1 (so called best equilibrium).
24 In this 
equilibrium, the cut-off point  0 1< k  is the smallest root of the binding incentive compatibility constraint 
0 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 0 , 1 )) ( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( )) ( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( π δ δ π δ δ π σ
∆ + Φ − + − − = Φ − + − − = k c p k c p l h ,  (11) 
where  0 , 1 π  is the equilibrium payoff, and the more firm cares about the future the more likely it is to 
remain trustworthy, that is  −∞ =
→ 1 1 limk
δ
. 
As in the CO model, the key variable in the analysis is the continuation probability during the 
reputation phase. So, by (9) and (11), in order to evaluate whether collective branding is optimal, that is, 
) ( 0 , 0 , 1 n n k π π π = ≤ , 
we simply need to check whether  1 k kn ≤  for some  1 > n . Section 4 explores conditions under which it is 
easier to maintain a good reputation under a collective brand than under an individual brand, and the 
determinants of the optimal number of firms participating in the collective brand.  
  
                                                      
24 A perfect public equilibrium is a profile of purchasing and effort strategies (such as (2) and (10)) that depend only on the 
public history 
t H  and that, beginning at any period t  and given any public history 
t H , form a Nash equilibrium from that 
period on.  
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4.  OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH LOCAL PEER MONITORING 
To simplify the presentation, we first consider the case with very local peer monitoring,  1 = z . The polar 
cases with  0 = z  (no peer monitoring) and  1 − ≥ n z  (global peer monitoring) are considered in Section 
5.  
Our main result is that even with very local peer monitoring, firms achieve higher profits by 
pooling reputations when the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1.
25 
 
Proposition 1 For each set of values  σ / ∆  and τ , there exists a threshold discount factor  1 ˆ < δ  such 
that for all  δ δ ˆ ≥ , collective branding is optimal, i.e.  1
* > n .  
 
When the future is sufficiently important, there exists a group in which peer punishment is credible and 
collective public punishment can be softened relative to individual public punishment. In particular, we 
consider a group with   
2
1) ( k n ∆ =
σ  members and a cut-off point of the public signal  = k
~
1 k , which is 
the optimal cut-off point under an individual brand that solves equation (11). The proof consists of 
showing that for a sufficiently large discount factor, the incentive compatibility constraints (6)–(8) are 
satisfied for the chosen values of n and k
~
, which implies that there exists an equilibrium with collective 
branding in which collective public punishment is triggered less frequently relative to the equilibrium 
with individual public punishment. 
Consider first the no-shirking constraint in (6). This constraint may be difficult to satisfy when 
the unraveling of cooperation (as more firms find out that other firms have started shirking) takes many 
periods, because  ∞ → ≈ ∆
2
1) ( k n σ  for  1 → δ . This tends to reduce the threat of peer punishment, as a 
large share of firms will not know about the ongoing shirking for a long time. Nonetheless, given our 
choices of the size of the group n and the cut-off point k
~
, peer punishment will eventually reduce the 
continuation probability enough to offset the long time it takes before a large fraction of members start 
shirking. To see why, note that the long-run continuation probability during the peer punishment phase 
(that is, when all firms shirk) is given by  2
1 ) 0 ( 1 )
~
( 1 = Φ − ≈ + Φ −
∆
σ
n k . This number is significantly 
less than the continuation probability in the best equilibrium under individual reputation with a single 
shirking firm, because  1 ) ( 1 1 → + Φ −
∆
σ k  as  1 → δ .
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Second, we need to verify that the upward deviation (that is, credibility) constraints in (7) and (8) 
hold. An asymmetry between the no-shirking and peer sanction credibility constraints is worth pointing 
out: When a firm contemplates shirking for the first time, it believes that it will trigger a peer punishment 
phase. However, during a peer punishment phase, each firm has a relatively smaller impact on the 
behavior of the other firms, because the (out-of-equilibrium) shirking is believed to be irreversible, as no 
firm can unilaterally prevent the punishment phase from evolving (beyond slowing it down). So, as the 
group becomes larger, each member has less individual impact on the evolution of the punishment phase, 
and thus the credibility constraints are easier to satisfy. Given our choice of n, an increase in δ  affects 
both the importance of the future rents, which makes the credibility constraints more difficult to satisfy, 
and the size of the group, which makes the credibility constraints easier to satisfy. Yet, even as  1 → δ , 
                                                      
25 Because we assume that each firm observes the effort choices of at most two other firms, 
* n  takes only odd values. A 
deviating firm triggers a more severe punishment when two other firms start deviating rather than one. When  1 > n  is odd, each 
deviating firm is, in fact, punished by two other firms during the beginning of the peer punishment phase. When n is even, some 
firms expect to cause just one more firm to switch to low effort during the unfolding of the peer punishment phase.  
26 As shown in the CO model, in equilibrium and with individual reputation, the firm’s continuation payoff is the same 
whether or not it shirks, because the no-shirking incentive compatibility constraint binds.  
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the size effect dominates, because the individual effort’s impact on the continuation probability is 






σ .  
However, just as a group that is too small may not generate a threat of collective shirking that 
deters individual shirking more effectively than individual public punishment, a group that is too large 
can also weaken the threat of collective shirking. Even though collective shirking is easier to detect in 
larger groups, the threat of triggering peer punishment fades when shirking takes too long to spread 
among firms. In fact, we next demonstrate that too many members cannot sustain collective reputation of 
high quality.  
 
Proposition 2 For each set of values δ ,  σ / ∆ , τ , the optimal size 
* n  is finite.  
  
Proposition 2 shows that the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium may exist only if the number of firms 
is not too great.
27 As the case with global peer monitoring in Section 5 makes clear, the bigger, the better 
result does not hold, because private monitoring among the members of the group is local, since, by 
assumption, each firm only observes choices of its nearest neighbors. Thus, the disadvantage of a large 
group is that a member that contemplates shirking anticipates that it will take a long time before many of 
the more distant firms realize that cooperation is unraveling. Since the future payoffs are discounted, the 
threat of collective shirking evaporates when the number of firms in the group is too large, because 
individual shirking will effectively be unnoticed by too many members for too many periods.
28  
Comparative Statics 
Next we will investigate how the optimal group size and reputation depend on the parameters of the 
model. We show that 
* n  (weakly) and  ) ( 1 * n k Φ −  increase in δ  and  σ / ∆  but decrease in τ  for 
sufficiently small values of 
* n  and large values of τ . When the cost savings from shirking are large 








is large—the credibility constraints (7) and (8) 
are easily satisfied, unlike the no-shirking constraint (6).
29 Thus, for sufficiently large τ  at optimum with 
a positive average payoff, two conditions must hold: (a) the no-shirking constraint (6) binds; and (b) all 
else equal, either group expansion or contraction increases the average payoff from shirking (which 
makes the no-shirking constraint more difficult to satisfy). In addition, note that the (out-of-equilibrium) 
full unraveling of the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium takes at most 
*
2
1 n z  periods, though it may 
unravel sooner if the public signal falls below the cut-off point. Thus, the average payoff in the beginning 
of the peer punishment phase 
1 ,
* n π  is easier to calculate for small 
* n  because it converges to its 
stationary value after only a few periods.  
 
Proposition 3 The optimal size 
* n  is nondecreasing and the cut-offpoint  * n k  is decreasing in δ  and 
σ / ∆ ; 
* n  is nonincreasing and  * n k is increasing in τ  for sufficiently large τ  and small 
* n . 
 
                                                      
27 That is, for sufficiently large n , the unique perfect equilibrium is the repetition of (Don’t Buy, Low) in every period. 
28 Fishman et al. (2010) do not obtain the bigger, the better result, because in their model the marginal contribution of an 
individual member’s investment to the brand’s reputation becomes too small to compensate for the incentive to free ride when 
the number of firms in the group is too large. 
29 It is possible that (7) rather than (6) binds in equilibrium. For example, for  8 . 0 = τ ,  67 . 0 = δ ,and  4 / = ∆ σ , the 
optimal number of firms is  3
* = n , the optimal cutoff point is  0913 . 5 * − =
n k , and the shirking (credibility) constraint (7) binds.  
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Consider the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the group’s size when the no-shirking constraint 
(6) binds. The benefit of adding a member to the group is that collective shirking is easier for consumers 
to detect because signal (1) becomes less noisy, which makes peer sanction a more powerful deterrent. 
The costs of adding a member to the group are twofold: (a) the consequences of individual shirking 
appear less severe as the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium unravels more slowly; and (b) the 
continuation probability, when all else is equal, is less sensitive to individual shirking. As a result, peer 
sanction and public punishment become less powerful deterrents in the short run. 
As the future becomes more important (or as trades occur more frequently), the no-shirking 
constraint (6) is easier to satisfy, and, keeping group size fixed, the cut-off point of the public signal can 
be reduced. In addition, the long-run benefits of expansion increase relative to the short-run costs of 
expansion, and the optimal size of the group increases, which allows for an even softer public 
punishment. The relationships among the discount factor, the optimal group size, and the cut-off point are 
depicted in Figure 4.1 (recall that  0
* = n  means that (Don’t Buy, Low) is the unique equilibrium in every 
period).
30 
Figure 4.1—Group size, cut-off point, and discount factor for  1 = τ  and  1 / = ∆ σ  
 
Source:  Author’s numerical analysis. 
In the case of either a small decrease in the cost savings from shirking or an increase in the 
quality premium, the intuition is similar. As the ratio τ  increases, constraint (6) is more difficult to 
satisfy, which necessitates a more severe public punishment—that is, a larger  * n k . In addition, the long-
run value of reputation (or the present value of expected quality premium) decreases relative to the one-
time deviation gain. This, in turn, decreases the long-run marginal benefit of size (due to collective 
shirking) relative to its short-run marginal cost (due to slower unraveling of cooperation and less-
conspicuous individual shirking), and the optimal group size falls (Figure 4.2).  
 
                                                      
30 Plotting the survival probability  ) ( 1 * n k Φ −  is perhaps more intuitive. We plot  * n k  instead because the survival 
probabilities are too close to 1 when  1















Figure 4.2—Group size, cut-off point, and relative gain from shirking for  95 . 0 = δ  and  1 / = ∆ σ  
 
Source:  Author’s numerical analysis. 
A public signal that is more precise (higher  σ / 1 ) or more sensitive to an individual effort (higher 
∆) allows for a softer public punishment (lower  * n k ) because public monitoring is more accurate. A more 
informative public signal also raises the long-run benefit of adding another member, because collective 
shirking is more likely to lead to the public punishment phase. It also reduces the short-run costs of 
adding another member because, all else equal, the continuation probabilities during the unraveling of the 
peer punishment phase decrease and the sensitivity of the public signal to individual shirking increases. 
The effects of the informativeness of the public signal on the optimal cut-off point and group size are 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3—Group size, cut-off point, and precision of public information for  95 . 0 = δ  and  1 = τ  
 
Source:  Author’s numerical analysis. 
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After inspecting Figures 4.1–4.3, it is worth noting that the optimal group size is considerably less 
sensitive to changes in the informativeness of the public signal in comparison with that for the other 
parameters (that is, the discount factor and the relative gain from shirking). This is explained by the 
customer information structure, whereby the effort (ex ante quality) is observed with additive (white 
Gaussian) noise with a thin-tail distribution. This property can be useful in an empirical application of our 
model because, as Figure 4.3 demonstrates, there is no need to precisely estimate  σ / ∆  as long as 
customers have enough information about firms’ performance (for example, for  95 . 0 = δ  and  1 = τ , an 
equilibrium in which high quality is provided exists only if  3 . 0 / > ∆ σ ). For a reasonable range of the 
other parameters— ) 99 . 0 , 8 . 0 ( ∈ δ  and  ) 85 . 3 , 3 . 0 ( ∈ τ —the optimal group size is between 3 and 133 
members. However, if we further restrict the discount factor— ) 95 . 0 , 85 . 0 ( ∈ δ —and the relative gains 
from shirking— ) 1 , 3 . 0 ( ∈ τ —the optimal group size is between 7 and 51 members. These numerical 
examples indicate that for  1 = z , producer groups that cannot rely on exclusion and external sanctions to 
punish shirkers must be rather small to be successful.  
The analysis above applies to groups with local peer monitoring: each member observes and is 
observed by a small number of other members. We next investigate how the intragroup information 
structure affects the optimal number of firms in the group. Because the effect of a marginal increase in  z  
(the size of the neighborhoods in which firms observe one another’s efforts) is somewhat cumbersome to 
evaluate, we proceed by investigating the extreme cases with no peer monitoring and with global peer 
monitoring. 
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5.  INTRAGROUP INFORMATION 
We now consider two polar intragroup information structures: no private information ( 0 = z ) and perfect 
private information about all other members’ effort choices ( 1 − ≥ n z ).  
No Peer Monitoring 
For  1 > n  and  0 = z , firms have no private information about other firms’ choices, and the effort strategy 
in (3) coincides with that under individual reputation in (10). Note that without peer monitoring, there are 
no implementable peer sanctions decoupled from the public punishment. Therefore, by (10), the no-
shirking constraint (6) is simply given by 
  0 , 0 , 0 , ))
~
( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ))
~
( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( n n l n h n k c p k c p π δ δ π δ δ π
σ
∆ + Φ − + − − ≥ Φ − + − − = .  (12) 
As before, in the equilibrium that maximizes the firms’ average payoff, the cut-off point of the public 
signal  n k  is the smallest k
~
 such that the no-shirking constraint (12) holds. If there are no k
~
 such that 
(12) holds, then in equilibrium, (Don’t Buy, Low) is played in every period, and  0 , n π 0 = .  
 
Proposition 4 If firms do not observe one another’s choices, then  1
* ≤ n . 
 
Collective reputation that is not complemented by peer monitoring gives an opportunity to free ride on 
other members’ efforts, and the incentive to free ride increases with the group’s size, because the 
sensitivity of the public signal to the individual choice of effort diminishes with size at rate 
n σ
∆ . In the 
absence of peer monitoring, there is no upside to sharing a common reputation since firms can base their 
punishment only on the public signal. Because customers and firms have the same information about the 
overall effort, firms can do no better than exert high effort when customers are willing to buy and play 
(Don’t Buy, Low) if they are not willing to buy at a price above  l v . Therefore, because of the incentive to 
free ride on common reputation, the no-shirking constraint is necessarily more difficult to satisfy, and the 
public punishment must be made harsher relative to that under individual reputation (that is, the cut-off 
point of the public signal must increase) in order to restore the members’ incentive to exert high effort.  
Hence, as long as firms do not have private information about each other, they can achieve a 
higher average payoff under individual branding than under collective branding in the cut-off trigger 
strategy equilibrium. In fact, using the technique in the CO model, it can be shown that in the absence of 
peer monitoring, a perfect public equilibrium that yields the highest average payoffs for a group of n firms 
is the trigger strategy equilibrium with the smallest cut-off point  n k  that satisfies the no-shirking 
constraint (12). Thus, an even stronger result is true that firms can achieve greater average payoffs under 
individual reputation than the highest payoff under collective reputation in any perfect public equilibrium 
without peer monitoring. Next we show that firms always benefit from collective reputation in a 
sufficiently large group, provided that each firm has perfect information about past choices of all the other 
firms in the group.  
Perfect Global Peer Monitoring 
We now suppose that all firms observe one another’s efforts, that is,  1 − ≥ n z . In accordance with the 








− <  and each firm observes past efforts of all other firms, then  ∞ →
* n . 
 
Under perfect global peer monitoring, the information aggregation and peer monitoring effects dominate 
the free-riding effect in a sufficiently large group.
31 Peer punishment is fast working in the sense that 
there is just a one-period delay (due to the simultaneity of effort choices in the stage game) before all 
members start shirking collectively following a one-member deviation. In addition, as  ∞ → n , peer 
punishment in equilibrium entails a nearly certain loss of customers’ trust, because customers can easily 
detect collective shirking. 




− < , let us rewrite it as  ) 1 )( ( 1 δ δ + − > −
−
l h
c v c v
h h . In this form, it 
says that the present value of the social surpluses over the infinite horizon (the maximum firm’s payoff) is 
greater than the present value of the deviation gains today and tomorrow (the gain from shirking under 
perfect public monitoring with a two-period lag). Although in a large group that maintains trust with its 
customers and among its members, individual shirking has little effect on the public signal today, it is 
almost certain to cause the group to lose its reputation tomorrow. Therefore, the above condition is 
necessary for the no-shirking constraint (6) to be satisfied when  1 − ≥ n z  and  ∞ → n .  
Furthermore, under perfect global peer monitoring, as  ∞ → n , collective reputation allows firms 
to attain the average payoff of  h h c v − , which is the highest attainable payoff under perfect public 
monitoring (that is, when the past effort choices are known not only to the firms but also to all 
customers). Therefore, in an equilibrium with collective reputation and trigger purchasing and effort 
strategies (2) and (3), a sufficiently large group of perfectly globally privately informed firms can achieve 
a higher average payoff than that in any other perfect equilibrium with fewer firms. To recap, propositions 
4 and 5 demonstrate that the intragroup information structure plays a critical role in a group’s ability to 
establish a good collective reputation and in determining the optimal group size. 
Our comparative statics results generate empirically testable hypotheses about the relationship 
between participation in collective brands such as GIs and characteristics of the product and producers. 
Even though the real-world structure of GIs is not necessarily optimal due to fixed natural boundaries and 
geography, data on long-lasting and successful GIs (that is, GIs that happen to apply to a group of 
producers with appropriate characteristics that enable building cooperation and trust) should still exhibit 
patterns predicted by our model. Propositions 3–5 suggest that the size of GIs should be greater when GI-
labeled products are sold more frequently, when cost savings from providing low quality are smaller 
relative to price premium for high quality, and when producers who are entitled to use a GI label are more 




                                                      
31 Che (2002) obtained a similar the bigger, the better result in a setting with group lending. In addition, Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990) showed that in the perfect monitoring setting, two firms may find it easier to collude if they interact in multiple 
markets. Matsushima (2001) considered the setting of imperfect monitoring and proved that two firms can approach perfect 
collusion when the number of market contacts goes to infinity.  
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6.  ROBUSTNESS TO RENEGOTIATION 
Renegotiation between Customers and the Group 
We assume that customers and firms do not try to renegotiate the implicit agreements to punish each other 
following a bad public signal. Recall that after the public signal falls below the cut-off point, the 
equilibrium strategies (2) and (3) call for Nash reversion (Don’t Buy, Low) during the public punishment 
phase. However, this is not an efficient outcome, and both customers and the group of firms have a strong 
incentive to renegotiate their implicit (self-enforcing) agreement to play (Don’t Buy, Low). The CO model 
demonstrates that in a single (horizontally integrated) firm, there exists an efficient renegotiation-proof 
equilibrium that replaces the infinite repetition of Nash reversion, with a temporary public punishment 
that consists of low prices offered by the firm until the public signal exceeds a certain threshold. This 
construction naturally extends to collective reputation and a group of firms, because the implicit contract 
between customers and the single firm in the CO model is identical to the implicit contract between 
customers and the group of firms in our model.  
Renegotiation among the Group Members  
We also assumed that shirking by one firm triggers subsequent shirking by its neighbors forever 
afterward, and that this is the sequentially optimal response. However, firms that know that the unraveling 
of the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium is underway (or is complete) will have a strong incentive to 
renegotiate their implicit (self-enforcing) agreement to shirk. To check whether the reputation-by-
cooperation equilibrium is robust to renegotiation among firms during the peer punishment phase, we 
need to consider two cases.  
Suppose that the no-shirking constraint (6) binds in equilibrium. Then, keeping the customers’ 
strategy fixed, equilibrium is renegotiation-proof according to the criterion derived in Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stachetti (1993)—that is, there are no other self-enforcing agreements among firms that never give each 
shirker a lower continuation value after any history. This is because the no-shirking constraint (6) binds 
given that the firms anticipate the worst sequentially optimal punishment—shirking forever. Therefore, 
there can be no other subgame perfect equilibria in which customers follow the trigger strategy with the 
prescribed cut-off point, because the no-shirking constraint will necessarily not be satisfied.  
However, if in the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium, an upward deviation (credibility) 
constraint (7) binds, then the equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof according to that criterion. In this 
case, a weaker renegotiation-proof self-enforcing peer punishment can be constructed while satisfying the 
no-shirking constraint with the given cut-off point of the public signal. For example, a weaker peer 
punishment can be implemented using strategies that prescribe firms to shirk for a given number of 




                                                      
32 Strategies with temporary punishment phases are used to construct equilibrium with imperfect public monitoring in Green 
and Porter (1984).  
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7.  WELFARE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Note that in the absence of institutions that provide legal protection for the right to use a GI label, such as 
the system of certification marks in the United States that certify the area of production (USPTO 2011), 
the entire industry (appropriately defined) can be thought of as a collective brand. Suppose there are 
M N ≤  firms in the industry, where M  is the measure of the mass of consumers. The size of the 
industry is exogenously fixed (for example, due to a resource constraint), and peer monitoring is local—
that is,  1 = z . Consider a trigger-strategy equilibrium in which N firms participate in the collective brand, 
and the cut-off point is  N k  (which yields the highest payoff for firms when there are N firms in the 
group). In this equilibrium, the time-averaged (per period) social welfare is given by 
)) ( 1 ( 1













The simplifying assumption that the firms set the price equal to the customers’ willingness to pay and 
extract the entire surplus from trade implies that  ) ( ) ( N N k N k W π =  and that maximizing the industry’s 
profits also maximizes social welfare. Therefore, we can evaluate the effects of collective branding on 
equilibrium payoffs by comparing  ) ( N k π  and  ) ( * n k π , where we assume that 
* /n N  (that is, the number 
of collective brands in the industry) is an integer. Because  * n N k k ≥ , it must be that group branding 
increases firms’ payoffs, since socially efficient trade lasts longer when there are several smaller 
collective brands (rather than one large collective brand with   N n = ). Thus, collective branding 
(weakly) increases welfare because  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n N N k W k N k N k W = ≤ = π π . 
Next we show that profit-maximizing collective brands also increase welfare when consumers 
retain some of the surplus from trade. For example, suppose that in addition to N efficient firms, the high- 
quality products are also competitively supplied by inefficient firms that use a costlier technology with the 
constant marginal cost  ) , ( 0 h h v c c ∈  and that can freely enter and exit the industry.
33 Our previous 
analysis remains unchanged except that now the efficient firms charge at most  h t i v c p < = 0 , , so that the 












c c  increases. When the high-quality products 
are inelastically supplied at price  0 c , the privately optimal group size is smaller—
) , / , , ( ) , / , , (
*
0
* z n z n σ τ δ σ τ δ ∆ ≤ ∆ , where the inequality follows by Proposition 3. Again, for 
simplicity, we suppose that  ) , / , , ( / 0
* z n N σ τ δ ∆  is an integer and that there is a  N k  that satisfies (6)–
(8) for  0 c p =  and n = N. Because the alternative technology is costlier—that is,  h c c > 0 —the product is 
(initially) supplied by N efficient firms, and the remainder of the demand ( N M − ) is satisfied by the 
competitive fringe. The effect of collective branding on social welfare is still positive because 
) )( (
)) ( 1 ( 1
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h N h h
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Φ − −





                                                      
33 The additional costs can be due to third-party monitoring and enforcement of compliance with a quality standard.  
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The inequality follows because the efficient firms (while group reputation is good) generate more social 
surplus than the inefficient firms do, and the efficient firms remain trustworthy and trade with customers 
longer when they can form smaller groups. 
  This result can be applied to GIs. Legal protection of the right to use a GI was debated during the 
recent rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (ERS 2011). One argument against the protection of GIs is 
that regional brands can make it easier to sustain a “quantity cartel” and reduce competition. In our 
model, less legal protection for the right to use a GI effectively amounts to an increase in the number of 
firms (as well as likely loss of “informational connectedness” among them) that participate in the 
collective brand and that share a common reputation. Thus, protection of GIs can raise welfare by making 
it easier for firms to maintain customers’ trust, because peer monitoring is ineffective in a group that is 
too large or that lacks “informational connectedness.”
 34 Note that in our model, the mechanism through 
which GIs raise welfare is very different from the one based on fixed certification costs and groupwide 
economies of scale in Moschini, Menapace, and Pick (2008).  
Traceability and Food Scares  
Although participation in GIs is voluntary, mandatory firm-level traceability directly affects producers’ 
commitment to remain unknown to their customers and belong to the group, because producers with a 
history of low quality can now be punished by exclusion from the group. The threat of exclusion 
effectively puts customers in charge of punishing individual producers. It also makes it more difficult for 
groupwide norms that incentivize the provision of quality by prescribing collective shirking as a 
punishment for individual shirking. Therefore, in our setting, mandatory traceability may decrease 
welfare even without taking into account the direct costs of the policy’s implementation (Golan et al. 
2004).
35 
Our model has a lack of firm-level traceability within a group (for example, it is prohibitively 
costly to identify the member of the group that supplied a particular product after it is purchased and 
consumed), but intergroup traceability is perfect in that consumers can (at no cost) verify the identity of 
the group in which the product originated. Therefore,  ] 1 , 0 ( 1 ∈ n —the probability that a given product is 
supplied by firm i —measures the degree of traceability (in the sense that each product can be traced 
back to n potential firms of origin) in an industry with N firms and N/n collective brands.
36 Suppose that 
the industry cooperatively chooses the degree of traceability to maximize industrywide profits. We 
showed that in the industry with internal knowledge of production practices, incomplete traceability is 
optimal; in this case, there is perfect traceability at the group level but no firm-level traceability within the 
group of n
* firms. Thus, a mandatory increase in the degree of traceability (up to firm-level traceability) 
from 
* / 1 n  to  n / 1 , for 
* 1 n n ≤ ≤ , decreases both welfare and the incentives to increase the level of 
food safety: 
) ( n k W ) ( * n k W ≤  for 
* 1 n n ≤ ≤ , 
because punishment of individual shirking by collective shirking is ineffective in a group that is too small. 
                                                      
34 In a complementary contribution, Fishman et al. (2010) also showed that GIs and state trading enterprises can increase 
quality and welfare.  
35 Note that although there is no direct liability for low quality in our model, (noisy) exogenous punishment for shirking will 
not qualitatively change our results. Pouliot and Sumner (2008) studied a model in which producers are liable for safety lapses 
and found that a greater degree of traceability increases producers’ incentives to provide a high level of food safety.  
36 Pouloit and Sumner (2009) modeled the degree of traceability as the probability of identifying the firm of origin of a 
particular product. Note that individual (firm-level) brands cannot differentiate firms with good and bad reputation as long as 
buyers cannot ex post relate their consumption experience with the product to its firm of origin.  
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Furthermore, the model explains why a frequently observed long-lasting decrease in demand and 
a loss of public confidence in the industry following the news of isolated incidents of food contamination 
(so called food scares) may, in fact, be efficient.
37 Suppose the parameters are such that the industry’s 
profits are maximized when all firms participate in a single collective (industry) brand—that is,  n N k k ≤  
for all  N n ≤ . In our model, food scares are consistent with an equilibrium response of consumers when 
the public signal falls below the cut-off point because one firm in the group performed very poorly. This 
happens when  t i h e , ε +  is very low (an isolated food safety incident) for firm i  and when  t j h e , ε +  are 
high (no food safety problems) for the other firms  i j ≠ . The intuition is that such food scares (that is, the 
loss of customers’ trust in the entire industry due to an ex post bad performance by one member) are 
efficient because they also scare producers and sustain industrywide norms of compliance. Producers who 
are peer monitored and anticipate a long-lasting loss of reputation as a result of a single food safety 
incident anywhere in the industry provide safety not only to retain customers but also to convince other 
producers that they are willing to cooperate with them in earning and maintaining customers’ trust. 
Firm Size  
Our model also contributes to the theory of the optimal firm size. A group of firms selling products under 
the umbrella of a collective brand can be seen as an extreme case of a horizontally integrated firm with 
decentralized management of its branches and affiliates. (As before, we ignore any direct linkages across 
branches and economies of scale.) With this interpretation of our model, it is worth noting that our 
comparative statics results are the opposite of those in the CO model of the firm’s reputation. In the CO 
model, the degree of horizontal integration (that is, the firm’s size) is smaller when (1) the future is more 
important and information is disseminated more rapidly, or (2) the deviation gain is smaller relative to the 
reputation premium, or (3) the customer’s information about firms’ quality choices is more precise. The 
difference in the comparative statics is explained by the different mechanisms through which size affects 
the cost of maintaining trust under horizontal integration (one owner) and collective branding (many 
owners). In the CO model, although there is no free-riding problem, it is difficult for customers to punish 
partial deviations by a large firm that maintains high overall quality while offering low quality to a subset 
of customers. In our model, the threat of a breakdown in cooperation curbs free riding; however, it can do 
so only in a group (that is, a firm with decentralized management) of an appropriate size. 
Our findings suggest that peer monitoring can align the interests of independent firms and 
substitute for horizontal integration. Combining our results with those of the CO model generates an 
empirically testable hypothesis: All else equal, branch managers should be more independent in large 
firms that trade more frequently, that are subject to more public scrutiny, and whose reputation premiums 
are greater relative to the cost savings from shirking. 
                                                      
37 There are many examples of food scares involving eggs, fresh produce, peanuts, pistachios, pet food, and dairy—as well 
as scares related to nonagricultural products such as toys and drywall—in which isolated safety incidents affected sales of the 
entire industry (Pouliot and Sumner 2009). Furthermore, some empirical evidence suggests that the effect of food scares on 
consumption persists after the source of contamination has been identified and media coverage has declined (Mazzocchi 2006).  
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8.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed a simple model of collective reputation in which customers have imperfect 
information about the overall choice of effort and in which firms perfectly observe choices of (possibly 
just a few) other firms in the group. The model contributes to the theory of the firm, and we used it to 
study the optimal number of firms in the collective brand and to derive comparative statics results that can 
be empirically tested against the real-world patterns of geographic-origin labeling. Our analysis explains 
how local social norms can help sustain the reputation of regional products, as well as why food scares 
may be a necessary disciplining device. We also show that an assessment of welfare effects of GIs and 
traceability in value chains with multiple upstream suppliers should take into account intragroup behavior. 
The advantage of collective reputation that is sustained by groupwide social norms, rather than by 
a minimum quality standard enforced by external auditing, is that it relies on the private information of 
group members and does not require additional expenditures on the monitoring of compliance (Borgen 
2001; Lyon and Porter 2009).
38 The disadvantage is that such a “quality cartel” is sustainable only if 
certain conditions are met. Both group characteristics, such as size and internal structure, and producer 
and market characteristics, such as frequency of trades, customer information, quality premium, and 
production costs, may influence the group’s ability to achieve a reputation for high quality using trigger 
strategies and the end of trust within the group as a punishment for individual shirking. 
Our model suggests how verification costs that involve a variable cost of monitoring compliance 
(which increases with output) and a fixed cost of quality certification (which is independent of aggregate 
output) may determine the size and nature of a group that represents the cost-minimizing arrangement 
(Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008). On the one hand, a small group, in which members are close to 
each other, can use peer monitoring to save on external inspection and enforcement costs. The 
disadvantage of a small group is that the fixed certification costs are spread over fewer members. On the 
other hand, a large group can spread the fixed certification costs over a large base. The disadvantage of a 
large group is that it cannot rely on social norms when there is too little familiarity and interaction among 
its members, and it needs to incur the full cost of external auditing in order to signal quality. 
For example, many industry food safety programs, such as Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, 
rely on third-party inspections and explicit punishments for shirking (LGMA 2011).
39 Their diverse 
memberships likely make it difficult to sustain group norms, and the large fixed costs of credible 
certification (which includes expertise in food safety practices) give rise to significant economies of scale 
(Hardesty and Kusunose 2009). On the other hand, small farmer groups (studied in Moustier et al. 2010) 
are efficient, because quality requirements are group specific and internal inspections offer a cheap way 
of monitoring quality when members are similar and are located in close proximity to each other.  
For tractability, we made a restrictive assumption that firms have perfect (local) private 
information about other firms. A more realistic and natural assumption is that firms’ observations of the 
choices and product quality of other firms in a group are noisy but perhaps less so than that of their 
customers. Although infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring lack a tractable 
recursive structure (see, for example, Kandori 2002), some conditions under which a combination of 
noisy collective public punishment and peer sanctions is superior to a noisy individual public punishment 
can perhaps be identified. Our model can also be extended in a number of other ways, such as allowing 
for heterogeneous costs and firm sizes, asymmetric informational linkages, endogenous peer monitoring 
effort, imperfect traceability, punishment by member exclusion, and simultaneous use of both individual 
and collective brands to establish a reputation for quality. These extensions and empirical studies that 
structurally estimate determinants of collective reputation in a model with Bayesian learning, such as the 
one analyzed in this paper, await future research. 
 
                                                      
38 Minimum quality standards and exclusion for noncompliance in agricultural cooperatives have been discussed in Babcock 
and Weninger (2004), Hirschauer and Musshoff (2007), and Fatas, Jimenez-Jimenez, and Morales (2010). 
39 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
To simplify notation, we let  Φ − = Φ 1 . 
Proof of Proposition 1  
We start by showing that the incentive compatibility constraints (6)–(8) are satisfied when   
2




k k =  for sufficiently large δ . First, we verify the no-shirking constraint (6). In order to show that 
condition (6), that compares the payoff from cooperating and choosing high effort with the payoff from 
shirking, holds it will be convenient to bound the payoff from shirking and starting the peer punishment 
phase as follows:  
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σ  is used to obtain the first inequality. The 
last inequality must hold for sufficiently large δ  because taking the limit as  1 → δ , the right side 
converges to 0. To see why, note that by equation (11) that determines the optimal cut-offpoint for  1 = n , 
we have 
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where we applied l’Hôpital’s rule to obtain the second equality, treating the optimal cut-off point under 
individual reputation  1 k  as a function of the discount factor δ , and where we implicitly differentiated the 
binding incentive compatibility constraint (11) to find its derivative  δ d dk / 1  and to obtain the third 
equality. 
  Second, we verify the upward deviation (the credibility of peer punishment) constraints (7) and 
(8). Note that (8) is implied by (7), because the average payoff of a firm that shirks during the peer 
punishment phase  m n, π  decreases with the number of shirkers m . Therefore, we only need to verify that 
the constraints in (7) are satisfied. Let us rewrite (7) as follows:  
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But the left side converges to 0 as  1 → δ  for each  n n m ],..., , 3 min[ = .  
Hence, continuity implies that there exists an optimal cut-off point of the public signal  1 k kn <  
such that the incentive compatibility constraints (6)–(8) are satisfied for    1 ) (
2
1 > = ∆ k n σ  and  n k k =
~
. 
Therefore, sharing a common reputation is optimal, that is,  1
* > n , for all sufficiently large  1 < δ .  
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2  
It suffices to show that the no-shirking constraint (6) cannot hold for sufficiently large n —that is, 
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The following well-known property of single-crossing functions will be useful in the proof of 
Proposition 3. 
 
Lemma Suppose that (a) function  ) (t g ,  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = t , is single-crossing—that is, if  0 ) ( ≥ t g , then 
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Proof of Lemma 
Conditions (a) and (b) imply that there exists  1 ˆ ≥ t  such that  0 ) ( ≤ t g  for all  t t ˆ ,..., 1 , 0 =  and  0 ) ( > t g  



























t t g t δ . 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
By (9), the group size that maximizes the reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium payoff  0 , n π  also 
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Because the right side of (A2) is increasing in τ and the right side of (A4) is decreasing in τ , it must be 
that only (A4) binds at optimum for sufficiently large values of τ .  
To proceed, it will be convenient to let 
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so that the incentive compatibility constraint (6) can be rewritten as  0 ) / , , ; , ( ≥ ∆ σ τ δ n k G , and (A3) can 
be rewritten as 
k
n min  subject to  0 ) / , , ; , ( = ∆ σ τ δ n k G , 
because by assumption, constraints (7) and (8) do not bind. We ignore the integer constraint and treat 
* n  
as a continuous variable. Then the optimality conditions for problem (A3) become 
0 ) / , , ; , (
*
* = ∆ σ τ δ n k G
n  and        (A7a) 
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where  * n k  is the smallest root of equation (A7a) and the subscripts on function G denote its partial 
derivatives. Implicitly differentiating the system of equations (A7) yields 
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where  τ σ δ , / ,∆ = a , and we omit the arguments of function G to simplify notation. Next we determine 
the sign of  δ d dn /
*  and  δ d dk
n / *  by signing each term on the right sides of (A8) separately.
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40 So the obtained comparative statics results hold more generally.  
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The sum of the rest of the terms in (A10) is also negative for sufficiently small 
* n , which verifies that 
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* < ∆ σ τ δ τ n k G
n .  
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Suppose that  2 ≥ n  firms earn a strictly positive payoff in equilibrium. It must be that at optimum, the 
no-shirking constraint (12) binds because it cannot hold for  −∞ → k
~
. Therefore, we have  
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Hence, from (11), it follows that  n k k < 1 , that is, a single firm can achieve a higher average payoff than 
any group of  2 ≥ n  firms when  0 = z .
  Now suppose that the firm earns zero payoff in equilibrium under individual reputation, that is, 
(Don’t Buy, Low) is played in every period. The incentive compatibility constraint (11) cannot be satisfied 
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This proves that the incentive compatibility constraint (12) also cannot be satisfied for any  2 ≥ n , so that 
in equilibrium  0 , n π 0 = . 
      Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Under perfect global peer monitoring (that is, for  1 − ≥ n z ) in a reputation-by-cooperation equilibrium 
with cut-off point k
~
, by (3), the no-shirking constraint (6) becomes 
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However, it is easy to verify that both (A11) and (A12) are satisfied for  σ
∆ − = n k 2
1 ~





− < . So, as  ∞ → n , there exists a  σ
∆ − ≤ n kn 2
1  such that all incentive-compatibility constraints  
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are satisfied. Furthermore, as the number of firms increases, the per-firm average payoff approaches 
h h c v − , or the maximum social surplus in each period over the infinite horizon. Because this is the 
highest achievable payoff, it must be that  ∞ →
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